SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doing, we hope
to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the more
interestingchanges in significant areas of practice.
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Suazo, 133 N.J. 315, 627 A.2d 1074 (1993).

While patrolling Interstate 95, State Trooper Edwin Torres
pulled over an out-of-state vehicle because the vehicle was weaving
in traffic. Id. at 317, 627 A.2d at 1075. The car was occupied by
Ramon Suazo, the driver, and Nelson Hoyer, Suazo's passenger.
Suspecting that the driver was intoxicated, Torres asked Suazo to
step out of the car and questioned him. Standing at the rear of the
vehicle, Suazo blamed his erratic driving on exhaustion from a
week's worth of driving up from Georgia with only a short rest.
When asked by Torres whether his companion could have shared
the driving, Suazo answered that he did not know whether Hoyer
had a license and claimed to not even know his last name.
Torres then questioned passenger Hoyer who, still sitting in
the car, explained that they were on their way home after visiting
in the South and had been traveling for a few days. Id. at 318, 627
A.2d 1075. When asked where home was, Hoyer answered that he
was from Venezuela and admitted that he did not have a home in
the United States.
Suspicious of the conflicting stories, Torres had Suazo sign a
broad consent-to-search form and then proceeded to thoroughly
search the car while both men watched. In the trunk, Torres
found a red nylon clothes bag, with no identifying information,
which Hoyer claimed was his. Despite Hoyer's claim of ownership,
Torres opened the bag. Inside he found a paper bag containing
four brown packages, each containing a white powdery substance
later identified as four kilograms of cocaine. Both men denied
knowledge of the packages' contents.
Passenger Hoyer was indicted for both possession of a controlled dangerous substance and possession of a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute. Id., 627 A.2d at 1075
(citations omitted). Hoyer attempted to have the evidence suppressed on grounds that Suazo's consent to the search did not encompass a search of the luggage allegedly owned by Hoyer. Id.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that Torres could reasonably doubt the defendant's ownership of the bag because Hoyer
claimed ownership of the bag, yet denied knowledge as to the bag's
contents. Id. at 319, 627 A.2d at 1075. Hoyer entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance with in1157
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tent to distribute and in turn, the State dropped the charge of
possession. Id.
Hoyer appealed the denial of the motion to suppress to the
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. Id. The appellate
division affirmed in an unreported opinion, though for differing
reasons. Id. The court found that the search of the bag was valid
because Torres could justifiably infer that Suazo had authority over
both the car and its contents. Id. The court's determination was
based on the bag's lack of identifying information, Hoyer's failure
to protest the search of the bag, and Hoyer's denial of knowledge
of the bag's contents. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification, reversed, and remanded for retrial. Id. (citation omitted). The majority of the sharply divided court held that a driver's consent to a
warrantless search of a car did not extend to containers in which a
passenger in the car claimed ownership. Id. at 322, 627 A.2d at
1077.
Writing for the court, Justice Stein began the analysis by reviewing state and federal law on warrantless searches of property
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and the Article One of the NewJersey Constitution. Id. at 319, 627
A.2d 1076. The court first noted that a warrantless search is valid
where a party voluntarily gives his consent and understands his
right to refuse. Id. at 320, 627 A.2d at 1076. The majority observed
that consent may be obtained from a third party when that person
possesses common authority or a similar relationship to the property being inspected. Id. The justice also noted that a third party's
authority to consent may be lacking in situations where the third
party has disclaimed ownership of the container, or where the primary party has exclusive use and control of the property. Id. The
court acknowledged, however, that despite an officer's erroneous
belief in a third party's common authority over property, the
search will be valid if the belief was objectively reasonable in light
of the surrounding circumstances. Id., 627 A.2d at 1077 (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990)).
Turning to holdings of other jurisdictions, the Justice emphasized that other courts have concluded that a driver has the authority to consent to searches based on their immediate possession and
control of the car. Id. at 321, 627 A.2d at 1077 (citations omitted).
Conversely, the court noted that the driver's consent does not encompass the personalty of passengers when joint access or control
is lacking. Id. (citations omitted). Consideration of whether the
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passenger fails to object to the search or claim ownership of the
property, Justice Stein explained, is a material factor in determining whether a driver's authority to consent includes containers
found in the car. Id.
Turning to Hoyer's claim of ownership, the majority found
that Torres was put on notice of a superior privacy interest in the
bag and that reliance on the driver's consent to search the car was
unreasonable as to the search of the bag. Id. at 322, 627 A.2d 1077.
Thus, the court continued, once Hoyer asserted ownership, Torres
was under an obligation to seek his consent or make further inquiry before looking into the bag. Id. The court suggested that
the preferred, though not mandatory, method of search was to determine the ownership of each piece of luggage first so that he
could have justifiably relied on the driver's consent. Id., 627 A.2d
at 1077-78 (citing State v. Maristany, 133 N.J. 299, 308, 628 A.2d at
1070 (1993)). Lastly, the court stated that without evidence indicating that Hoyer was aware of his right to refuse, his silence was
not the equivalent of a waiver. Id. at 322-23, 627 A.2d at 1078 (citing Johnson, 28 N.J. 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)).
Justice Garibaldi, writing for the dissent, rejected the majority's conclusion by stating that Torres's conduct was objectively reasonable given the totality of the circumstances at the time of the
search. Id. at 323, 627 A.2d at 1078 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Accentuating the fact-specific nature of the inquiry, the Justice
stressed that the bag in question was not secured, had no identification and was opened without protest from Hoyer. Id. at 323-24,
627 A.2d at 1078 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting).
The Justice began her analysis by restating the rule that a warrantless search will be held valid if an officer held a reasonable,
though erroneous, belief that the consenting third party had common authority over the item searched. Id. at 325, 627 A.2d at 1079
(Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Delving more deeply into the facts, the
dissent asserted that Suazo, as the driver, had immediate possession and control over the vehicle and simply exercised this control
when he consented to the search of the entire vehicle. Id. at 326,
627 A.2d at 1079 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). The dissent further
noted that Suazo never disclaimed his ownership interest in the
bag when the officer opened the trunk. Id. Moreover, the dissent
emphasized, although Hoyer claimed ownership of the bag, he
never objected to the search and therefore acquiesced to it. Id.,
627 A.2d at 1079-80 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Taking into consideration the conflicting statements that Torres received, the dissent
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concluded that Torres could reasonably believe that Suazo had actual authority over the bag. Id., 627 A.2d 1080 (Garibaldi, J.,
dissenting).
The dissent further urged that given the split-second within
which Torres had to make a decision, the officer had "acted in
good faith without the leisure of a constitutional analysis grounded
on twenty/twenty hindsight." Id. at 327, 627 A.2d at 1080 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). Although the dissent agreed that the preferred procedure in such situations is to first ascertain ownership
of individual containers, the justice vehemently asserted that good
faith attempts by law enforcement "to do their job should not be
reviewed by courts against a holier-than-thou standard of exceedingly technical complexity." Id. (citation omitted).
Lastly, the dissent posited that although Suazo could not give
consent to search Hoyer's property, Hoyer gave implicit consent to
the search through his "presence and silence." Id. Thus, the justice declared that a mere equivocal claim of ownership does not
rise to the level of invalidating a third party's consent. Id. at 328,
627 A.2d at 1087 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). In fact, the justice insisted, a claim of ownership without more is inconsistent with an
expectation of privacy and could be seen as an acquiescence to the
search. Id. (citing United States v. Anderson, 859 F.2d 1171, 1177 (3d
Cir. 1988)). The dissent concluded that Torres's search of the bag
was reasonable based on Hoyer's incidental claim of ownership
coupled with his apparent acquiescence through his failure to object. Id.
Faced with choosing between efficiency in law enforcement or
protection of individual rights, the New Jersey Supreme Court has
once again chosen to safeguard the individual. As the majority recognized, an officer's disregard for an assertion of ownership in this
situation could lead the reasonable person to believe that he did
not have a right to object. In this case, the defendant was not silent
during the search, but only failed to specifically object to it.
Although the dissent criticized the majority for imposing overly
technical rules upon law enforcement, the dissent should not expect laypeople, who do not possess the typical police officer's
knowledge of search and seizure law, to know their right to object
to a search. Requiring police officers to inform a person of this
right is not unduly burdensome and can be disposed of quickly.
Although the interest of law enforcement efficiency is not served
well by this decision, the age of sophisticated communication that
makes obtaining protective backup and on-the-spot search warrants
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a reality, should adequately mitigate the inconvenience to law enforcement personnel.
Tamara Burke

CRIMINAL

LAW-SENTENCING-WHEN

COURTS FIND DEFENDANTS

GUILTY OF MULTIPLE UNRELATED DRUG OFFENSES, SUSPENSIONS
OF DRIVING PRIVILEGES IMPOSED ON THE SAME DATE MUST RUN

CONCURRENTLY-In

re T.B., 1993 WL 524670 (N.J. Aug. 3,

1993).
In re T.B. concerns incidents that took place when T.B. was a
juvenile. Id. at *1. Specifically, in May, 1990, T.B.'s mother reported to the police that she found cocaine in T.B.'s bedroom, and
one week later the police found cocaine on T.B.'s person.
T.B. admitted to two criminal counts of drug-possession. The
juvenile court sentenced him for both offenses on the same date,
imposing concurrent periods of detention and consecutive licensesuspensions for each of the drug counts. Id. T.B. appealed the juvenile court's decision to impose consecutive terms of suspension
of his license. Id. The appellate division affirmed the consecutive
suspension periods under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-16 (hereinafter
section 16). Id. (citing In re TB., 260 N.J. Super. 122 (1992)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification to resolve a split within the appellate division as to whether a sentencing
court has power to impose consecutive rather than concurrent license-suspensions under section 16. Id. Reversing the appellate
court's decision, the supreme court held that because sentencing
courts have a wide range of available sanctions, concurrent revocation of driving privileges better reflects the Legislature's intent behind section 16. Id.
In a per curiam opinion, the court began its analysis by summarizing the arguments of both parties. Id. at *2. The court first
pointed out that both parties relied on the plain language of section 16. Id. Specifically, T.B. relied on a portion of section 16
which provides that the term of suspension "shall commence on the
day the sentence is imposed." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-16).
T.B. argued that there are only two circumstances in which the pe-
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riod of suspension will be postponed. Id. According to T.B., the
first situation occurs when the offender is under the age of seventeen, in which case the license-suspension does not commence until the offender reaches seventeen, the legal driving age. Id. The
second circumstance occurs when the offender is currently under
suspension, in which event the new revocation commences on the
date the existing suspension, revocation, or postponement is terminated. Id.
The State, on the other hand, focused on that portion of the
statute that stated the suspension provisions pertain to "every person" who is adjudicated a delinquent for, or convicted of, "a violation of any offense" defined in the pertinent drug codes. Id.
(quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-16). The State argued that this
language is inconsistent with the Legislature's intent to impose
concurrent sanctions under all circumstances, regardless of how
appropriate consecutive sanctions may be. Id. The state further
asserted that the Legislature would have prohibited consecutive license suspensions in unquestionably clear terms had it so intended. Id. Finally, that State argued that the imposition of
concurrent license-suspensions "confer[s] a windfall on defendants" who are lucky enough to be sanctioned for different drug
offenses on the same day. Id.
The court then said that its interpretation of section 16 would
not necessarily affect the outcome of the case. Id. at *3. Continuing, the court concluded that license suspensions imposed on a
single sentencing date should run concurrently because a court
would be able to impose a one-year revocation on any or all of the
drug-possession counts. Id.
To support its position, the court explained that consecutive
penalties generally apply to chronologically-sequential convictions,
while concurrent sanctions are usually meant for simultaneous
convictions. Id. (citing State v. Hawks, 114 N.J. 359, 365 (1989)).
The majority elucidated that most drug offenses involve minor offenses requiring only probationary terms. Id. The court further
noted that the more serious offenders are imprisoned and consequently do not suffer the "separate sting" of license suspension because a license is effectively revoked during imprisonment anyway.
Id. The majority maintained, therefore, that it would serve no purpose to focus on revoking lesser offenders' driving privileges. Id.
The majority next interpreted the legislative intent behind section 16. Id. at *3-4. The court determined that the Legislature
sought to strictly punish, incapacitate, and deter the most culpable
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and dangerous drug offenders. Id. at *3. Accordingly, the majority
asserted that its statutory interpretation was in accord with the language of section 16, and would best further the Legislature's goal
of certain and fair punishment. Id. at *4.
The court proceeded to recognize the Legislature's intention
to distinguish among three categories of persons. Id. The first category, the court proffered, consisted of those who go into court
with previous suspensions; the second category consisted of those
who go into court without previous suspensions; and that the third
was made up of those who go into court not yet having driving
privileges. Id. The court asserted that the Legislature called for
delayed periods of suspension for offenders who fall in the first or
third categories. Id. On the other hand, the majority maintained,
the Legislature intended that offenders who fall in the second category receive suspensions between six and twenty-four months
which would begin on the day the court imposed the sentence. Id.
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-16). This range, the court opined,
provides adequate deterrence and appropriate punishment. Id.
Reversing the appellate court's decision and remanding to the
juvenile court, the majority held that mandatory license-suspensions imposed on a single sentencing date be concurrent because
this best reflected legislative intent and best furthered the goal of
efficient disposition of multiple drug offenses. Id. at *1, *3. Consequently, the majority explained, the juvenile court was free to suspend T.B.'s driving privileges for up to twenty-four months. Id.
Dissenting, Justice Stein,joined by Justice Clifford, argued that
the majority's conclusion conflicted not only with legislative intent,
but also with long-established principles governing concurrent and
consecutive sentencing. Id. at *4 (Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that when a statute is ambiguous, courts look beyond the statute's plain language to determine legislative intent.
Id. at *5 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Bridges, 131 N.J. 402,
407 (1993)). Justice Stein directed the court to view the statute as
a whole, and specifically to consider the statute's other provisions,
including amendments. Id. (citations omitted).
The 1988 amendment to section 16, the justice explained, provided that juveniles sentenced under section 16 would have their
suspensions commence on their seventeenth birthdays. Id. (citation omitted). Thejustice further noted that the 1988 amendment
provided that an offender who has suspended driving privileges at
the time of conviction should be subject to an additional suspension that would commence at the termination of the first suspen-
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sion. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Stein concluded, therefore,
that it would be erroneous to assume that the Legislature intended
to force the courts to impose less severe sanctions on convicted
drug-offenders simply because the trial court sentenced them for
all of the convictions on the same day. Id. (citation omitted).
Discerning the Legislature's intent, the dissent also looked to
the context in which the statute was adopted. Id. at *6 (Stein, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted). Section 16,Justice Stein stated, was
enacted under the Comprehensive Drug Reform Act of 1986
(CDRA). Id. (Stein,J., dissenting) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:351 to 36A-1). Continuing, the justice stressed that the CDRA's overall objective was certain, swift, and strict punishment, and that the
only authorized exceptions to these strict goals were described explicitly and restrictively. Id.
Finally, the dissent relied upon State v. Yarbough, which held
that where an offender committed crimes at different places or
times, the objectives of the crimes were independent of each other,
and multiple victims were involved, such an offender could receive
consecutive sentences. Id. (citing State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627,
644 (1985)). The justice insisted that the Legislature was aware of
the holding in Yarbough and had relied on it when drafting section
16. Id. The dissent determined, therefore, that the Legislature
had no intention of changing existing law established by Yarbough.
Id. Based upon the general policy of the CDRA and the principles
set forth in Yarbough, the justice concluded that section 16 allowed
courts the discretion to impose consecutive license suspensions on
offenders sentenced for more than one unrelated drug offense. Id.
(Stein, J., dissenting).
The majority missed the mark in holding that concurrent license-suspensions more closely reflect the NewJersey Legislature's
intent behind section 16. The decision is too rigid because it completely precludes courts from imposing consecutive suspensions, irrespective of how appropriate they might be. Ironically, the courts
themselves are limiting their own ability to use discretion in sanctioning drug offenders. It would seem appropriate for such a limitation on the courts to come from the Legislature. Indeed, such a
limitation should only come from clear legislative expression, and
in this case, such a clear intention is lacking.
Moreover, the court's decision is unfair because it arbitrarily
imposes less severe sanctions on drug offenders when they happen
to be tried and sentenced for multiple crimes on the same day. As
the decision stands, and as the state correctly argued, such offend-
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ers will receive windfalls because they will go essentially unpunished for some of their infractions. Clearly, this will not effectively
deter young offenders from committing multiple drug-related
crimes.
Kevin Ross

EMPLOYMENT LAW-LAw AGAINST DISCRIMINATION-A TwoYEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS APPLIES TO

FUTURE LAD

CLAIMs,

REGARDLESS OF How THEY ARE CHARACTERIZIED-Montells v.
Haynes, 133 N.J. 282, 627 A.2d 654 (1993).
On May 23, 1989, plaintiff Jessica Montells filed a sexual harassment claim against her employer, the American International
Adjustment Company (AIA), her supervisor, Ronald Haynes, and
various AIA officials. 133 N.J. at 285, 627 A.2d at 655. Montells
worked for the AIA from September 1986 until May 13, 1987. Id. at
286, 627 A.2d at 656. During that time, the plaintiff claimed supervisor Haynes made lewd comments and approached her with sexually suggestive behavior. Montells aserrted that, despite complaints
to company officials, AIA took no action. As a result, Montells resigned on April 29, 1987, received a salary until May 13, 1987, and
secured a higher-paying position with a new company on May 18,
1987.
More than two years later, the plaintiff initiated the present
action in the New Jersey Superior Court. The underlying suit alleged various common-law offenses, including breach of good
faith, constructive discharge, interference with future economic
opportunity, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery. The complaint also asserted one count of sexual
harassment creating a hostile work environment in violation of the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). In addition, the
plaintiff sought compensatory damages, punitive damages, and
pain and suffering for each of the injuries. Id. at 287, 627 A.2d at
656.
The Superior Court, Law Division, first determined that the
cause of action accrued no later than the last day AIA paid
Montells, May 13, 1987. Id. Next, the court applied the two-year
personal injury statute of limitations to the common-law offenses
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resulting in dismissal. Id. Conversely, the court distinguished the
LAD count from plaintiff's common law personal injury claims. Id.
Relying on Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., the court ruled that a LAD
claim presented a statutory cause of action that was primarily equitable in nature. Id. (citing Shaner v. Horizon Bancorp., 116 N.J. 433,
561 A.2d 1130 (1989)). Therefore, the trial court applied the general six-year statute of limitations. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
held that the two-year statute of limitations applied to all claims
asserted by the plaintiff. Id. at 288, 627 A.2d at 657. In its decision,
the court noted recent legislation that invoked a liberal interpretation of the LAD statute. Id. at 287-88, 627 A.2d at 656-57 (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13). In particular, the appellate court
weighed two amendments that made jury trials and tort remedies,
in addition to equitable relief, available to all LAD plaintiffs. Id.
On remand, the trial court similarly held that all of the claims were
primarily personal in nature. Id. Accordingly, the court applied
the two-year statute of limitations and granted summary judgment
for the defendants. Id. at 288, 627 A.2d at 657. The appellate division subsequently affirmed. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court
granted certification on the dismissal of plaintiff's LAD claim. Id.
Characterizing claims under LAD as more akin to personal injuries, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a single two-year
statute of limitations should apply to LAD claims. Id. at 286, 298,
627 A.2d at 655, 662. Declining to apply the statute retroactively,
however, the court remanded the matter back to the law division.
Id.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Pollock commenced a
three-part inquiry into the nature and purpose of LAD. Id. at 28998, 627 A.2d at 657-62. First, Justice Pollock addressed the merits of
a single statute of limitations. Id. at 289, 627 A.2d at 657. Cognizant of disparate outcomes, the justice cautioned that the application of inconsistent time limitations to claims based on similar facts
may frustrate the objectives of LAD. Id. The justice next observed
that the legislative history reflected a series of revisions designed to
expand the scope and available remedies of the statute. Id. One
amendment, the justice noted, allowed for a cause of action in superior court, in addition to the Division of Civil Rights. Id. The
justice added that a filing in the Division of Civil Rights was subject
to a 180 day filing requirement. Id., 627 A.2d at 658. Because this
filing requirement pertained only to administrative proceedings,
the court concluded that the statute of limitations had yet to be
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addressed to a LAD judicial action. Id. at 290, 627 A.2d at 658 (citing Nolan v. Otis Elevator Inc., 197 N.J.Super 468, 473, 485 A.2d 312
(App. Div. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 102 NJ. 30, 505 A.2d 580,
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986)). The justice looked beyond the
statutory language to determine the appropriate statute of limitations. Id.
Against a backdrop of common law, the court maintained that
a discrimination-free workplace is paramount to the New Jersey
public interest. Id. at 290, 627 A.2d at 658 (citing Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J. 319, 334-35, 537 A.2d 652 (citation omitted), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 826 (1988)). Further, the court continued, efficient processing of claims facilitates a nondiscriminatory work environment. Id. Conversely, the justice proffered that inconsistent
time limitations promoted needless litigation, thus creating inefficiency in the judicial process. Id. (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S.
261, 272-73, 275 (1985)).
The court supported this reasoning by highlighting the plaintiffs attempt to assert a lost wage claim on appeal. Id. at 291, 627
A.2d at 658. The justices noted two seemingly significant facts: that
Montells eventually secured employment at higher pay, and she
did not include wage loss in her original complaint. Id. Consequently, the court reasoned that the belated claim may have been
asserted to bolster support for a six-year statute of limitations. Id.
The court therefore posited that tandem goals of uniformity and
predictability further underscored the need for a single statute of
limitations under LAD. Id.
Second, the court focused its attention on the appropriate
statute of limitations. Id., 627 A.2d at 658-59. To this purpose, Justice Pollock asserted that the proper analysis turned on the underlying nature of LAD. Id. (citing Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J.
130, 145, 305 A.2d 412 (1973); Burns v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 20 N.J.
37, 45, 118 A.2d 544 (1955)). Specifically, the justice examined the
statutory distinction between claims categorized as "injury to the
person" and "tortious injury to the rights of another." Id., 627 A.2d
at 659 (citing N.J.S.A §§ 2A:14-1; 14-2). Thus, Justice Pollock explored whether LAD claims were essentially personal injuries involving physical and emotional harm, or actions for economic loss.
Id. at 291-92, 627 A.2d at 659 (citations omitted).
The court continued its analysis by noting recent amendments
that included damages such as physical and emotional distress,
trauma, anxiety, homelessness, disruption of career and family,
and adjustment problems, in addition to economic and time loss,
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within the scope of LAD. Id. at 292, 627 A.2d at 659. With these
additions characterized as personal injuries, the court held that the
two-year statute of limitations was best suited to meet the proffered
objectives of the more liberalized law. Id.
Moreover, the court elaborated that the goals of statutes of
limitations-timely claim adjudication, efficient litigation and repose-are best served by a two-year time limitation. Id. Additionally, the court emphasized that testimony regarding the facts of
sexual harassment claims is susceptible to error over time and is
difficult to obtain. Id. at 293, 627 A.2d at 659. Thus, the court
reiterated that a two-year statute is vital not only to the objectives of
LAD, but to fairness and equity within the judicial system. Id. at
293, 627 A.2d at 659-60.
Justice Pollock then analogized the instant case to a Supreme
Court decision involving federal civil rights legislation. Id. at 293,
627 A.2d at 660 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981). Thejustice noted that
in Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., the Supreme Court held that § 1981
claims extended beyond economic consequences to the individual
rights impinged by workplace discrimination. Id. (quoting Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62(1987)). Likewise, the
New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that discrimination claims
under LAD, while adjudicating some economic rights, are of primary import to personal injuries. Id.
Finally, the court reviewed nine jurisdictions that selected
three years or less as the appropriate statute of limitations for discrimination claims. Id. at 294, 627 A.2d at 660. Thejustices agreed
that whether the states adopted the federal standard, applied their
own personal-injury statute, or created a specific time limitation for
statutorily-created liabilities, the overriding goal was timely adjudication. Id. (citations omitted). The court was especially persuaded
by states that interpreted filing requirements prior to administrative proceedings as tantamount to statutes of limitations for subsequentjudicial actions. Id. As a result, the court concluded that the
two-year statute more closely aligned with the existing 180-day filing period before the New Jersey Division of Civil Rights. Id. at
294-95, 627 A.2d at 660.
Finally, the court addressed whether the statute of limitations
should be applied retroactively or prospectively. Id. Justice Pollock
first articulated that prospective application is appropriate when
the court establishes new law or decides an issue of first impression.
Id. (citing Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., 96 N.J. 419, 427, 476
A.2d 763 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1123 (1985)). On the other
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hand, the justice stipulated that retroactive application must be
balanced against the potential for inequitable results. Id., 627 A.2d
at 660-61.
The court then traced the inconsistent, albeit parallel course
of prospectivity in state and federal courts. Id., 627 A.2d at 661.
(citation omitted). Justice Pollock noted that when Montells filed
her complaint, New Jersey courts viewed claims of workplace discrimination as akin to property rights, governed by the six-year statute of limitations. Id. at 296, 627 A.2d at 661. The justice
maintained that this approach was based on the early treatment of
analogous § 1981 claims as contractual disputes. Id. (citing Leese v.
Doe, 182 N.J. Super. 318, 321, 440 A.2d 1166 (1981)). Although
overruled by Goodman, the justice contended that in New Jersey,
state courts continued to favor a six-year limitation for claims
under LAD. Id. (citation omitted).
Likewise, Justice Pollock maintained that the United States
District Court for New Jersey remained equally divided on the issue. Id. Prior to the plaintiff s action, the justice noted a district
court ruling that applied the six-year statute to a sexual harassment
claim. Id. (citing Skadegaard v. Farrell, 578 F. Supp. 1209 (D.N.J.
1984)). In contrast, the justice recognized a second pre-Montells'
decision, where another district court judge, relying on Goodman,
applied the two-year statute. Id. (citing White v. Johnson &Johnson
Products, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 33 (D.N.J. 1989)). Acknowledging the
unsettled law, Justice Pollock determined that Montells may have
justifiably relied on the six-year statute. Id. at 296-97, 627 A.2d at
661.
The court then concluded that the two-year statute should apply prospectively. Id., 627 A.2d at 662. Citing notions of fairness
and justice, the court asserted three reasons for a prospective application of its decision. Id. First, the court indicated that it has traditionally applied prospectivity to issues of first impression. Id.
Second, the court stated, prospective application is suitable for
murky or uncertain areas of the law. Id. at 298, 627 A.2d at 662.
Third, the court noted that prospectivity is appropriate when a
plaintiff may have reasonably relied on a different interpretation of
the law. Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the court reiterated the legislative goal to afford maximum protection to the victims of discrimination. Id. Applying these principals to the facts, the justice
concluded that the question of what statute of limitations applied
to LAD was sufficiently uncertain to justify plaintiffs reliance on a
six year period. Id. Thus, the court affirmed the decision of the
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appellate division in part, reversed in part and remanded the case
back to the law division. Id.
In a thoughtful and well-structured analysis, the New Jersey
Supreme Court prescribed an equitable solution to a troubling inconsistency in state law. Since 1945, the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD) has fulfilled guarantees of the state constitution to promote civil rights and freedom of economic pursuit. At
the heart of the statute lies the goal of eliminating unlawful discrimination in the workplace. In its decision, the court wisely eschewed mere labels to fairly represent the interests of all parties
within an efficient judicial process.
Pat Doyle

EMPLOYMENT LAW-SEXUAL HARASSMENT-HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT SEXUAL HARASSMENT Is ESTABLISHED BY SHOWING
CONDUCT THAT OCCURRED BECAUSE OF A PERSON'S SEX, WHICH
WAS SEVERE OR PERVASIVE ENOUGH TO MAKE A REASONABLE
WOMAN OR MAN BELIEVE THAT THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT HAD BEEN ALTERED AND THAT THE WORKING ENVIRON-

MENT HAD BECOME HOSTILE OR

ABusvE-Lehmann v. Toys 'R'

Us, Inc., 132 NJ. 587, 626 A.2d 445 (1993).
The plaintiff, Theresa Lehmann, was employed by Toys 'R' Us,
Inc. 132 N.J. at 593, 595, 626 A.2d at 448-49. She performed her
work under the immediate supervision of Don Baylous. Lehmann
observed Baylous inappropriately touch and make sexual remarks
toward other female employees. Id. at 595, 626 A.2d at 449. Beginning in January 1987, Baylous directed offensive sexual comments
toward Lehmann, such as "stick your tits out" or referring to her
"cute little ass." During the same month, Baylous increased the
severity of his harassing conduct. When the two of them were
alone in his office, he lifted the back of her shirt above her shoulders and exposed her bra, causing her to run from the office crying. Id. at 596, 626 A.2d at 449-50. Lehmann complained of these
incidents to Baylous's boss, but he told her to handle it herself. Id.,
626 A.2d at 450. Baylous's boss also advised Lehman not to report
this harassment to the Executive Vice President in charge of her
department.
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A few days later, Lehmann discussed the problem with the
Manager of Employee Relations, who subsequently spoke with Baylous about his inappropriate behavior. 'Despite this talk with the
manager, Baylous continued his sexual comments and touching of
Lehmann and other female employees over a two month period.
Id. at 597, 626 A.2d at 450. During this time, plaintiff Lehmann
again spoke with her superiors who told her that she was merely
paranoid. Subsequently, Lehman was offered a transfer, which she
rejected. Unhappy with the existing situation, Lehmann spoke
with the Executive Vice President. As a result of this conversation,
the personnel department again offered Lehman a transfer. Lehmann again refused the transfer, choosing instead to submit two
weeks notice of her resignation. Id. at 598, 626 A.2d at 450. Later
that day, following a heated exchange with Baylous, Lehman left
the office, and thereafter failed to complete her final two weeks of
work. Id., 626 A.2d at 451.
Subsequently, Lehmann brought a civil action against Toys 'R'
Us, alleging that she was subjected to a hostile work environment
on the basis of her sex in violation of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (LAD). Id. at 593, 626 A.2d at 448. Additionally,
she filed various separate claims including a battery claim against
Baylous. Id. The trial court dismissed all causes of action except
the battery claim and awarded her $5,000 in damages. Id.
On appeal, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
unanimously affirmed the trial court's dismissal of all non-LAD
claims. Id. The dismissal of the LAD claim was unanimously reversed and remanded back to the trial court for further fact finding. Id. The appellate court was unable to reach an agreement on
the correct legal and liability standard to be applied in evaluating
the LAD claims, thus prompting three separate opinions on that
issue. Id. at 593-594, 626 A.2d at 448-49.
Both parties appealed to the NewJersey Supreme Court. Id. at
594, 626 A.2d at 449. The court granted certification in order to
resolve the conflicting opinions of the appellate court below as to
the proper legal standard for stating an actionable claim of hostile
work environment sexual harassment under the LAD and the standard of liability to be imposed on the employer. Id.
Affirming, but modifying, the appellate division, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that to state a claim for hostile work
environment sexual harassment, a plaintiff must allege conduct
that occurred because of his or her sex, and that a reasonable person of that sex would consider the conduct, due to its severity or

1172

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:1157

pervasiveness, to have altered the employment conditions and created an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment. Id.
at 592, 626 A.2d at 448. Concerning an employer's liability, the
court held that an employer would be strictly liable for relief that is
equitable in nature. Id. For compensatory damages beyond equitable relief, the court held that the employer would be vicariously
liable under principles of agency law. Id. The court found no liability for punitive damages unless it is determined that the employer authorized, ratified, or participated in the harassment. Id.
The court remanded the case for findings of fact and further proceedings consistent with its opinion. Id. at 627, 626 A.2d at 466.
Justice Garibaldi, writing for a unanimous court, prefaced the
court's opinion with a short discussion of the background of the
LAD and the nature of sexual harassment claims. Id. at 600-01, 626
A.2d at 451-52. The court emphasized that one of the LAD's primary purposes is to provide a discrimination-free workplace. Id. at
600, 626 A.2d at 452. The court specifically identified N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 10:5-12 of the LAD as prohibiting discriminatory employment practices based on sex. Id. In analyzing the LAD claims, Justice Garibaldi observed that the New Jersey Supreme Court has
often looked to federal precedent under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 for guidance. Id. The justice noted, however,
that the court has never balked at rejecting federal precedent
when the circumstances so required. Id. at 601, 626 A.2d at 452.
Regarding the nature of a sexual harassment claim, the court
differentiated quid pro quo sexual harassment from hostile work
environment sexual harassment. Id. The court declared that quid
pro quo sexual harassment occurs when an employer threatens an
employee with the loss of his or her job, or some other similar adverse consequence, unless the employee submits to the employer's
sexual demands. Id. In contrast, the court asserted that hostile
work environment sexual harassment occurs when an employer, or
other employees, create a hostile work environment by harassing
an employee solely because of his or her sex. Id. Although most
harassment takes the form of sexual touchings or comments, Justice Garibaldi emphasized that the conduct must occur because of
the victim's sex. Id. at 602, 626 A.2d at 453 (citation omitted). The
justice stressed that the sexual nature of the conduct is immaterial
to the cause of action. Id.
Rather than substantially revise the Third Circuit's Andrews test
employed by the appellate division, the court announced a new
test to be utilized in establishing and examining a hostile work en-
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vironment sexual harassment claim. Id. at 603, 626 A.2d at 453
(citing Andrewsv. City of Philadelphia,895 F.2d 1469 (3d Cir. 1990)).
Justice Garibaldi articulated that a female must allege conduct that
occurred because of her gender and that a reasonable woman
would find to be severe or pervasive enough to alter employment
conditions, thus creating a hostile work environment. Id.
Although referencing the new test in terms of a female plaintiff,
the court posited that both men and women are protected under
the LAD and that both heterosexual and homosexual harassment
are prohibited. Id. at 604, 626 A.2d at 454.
The court submitted that the test could be broken down into
four prongs: (1) the conduct must have occurred because of the
plaintiff's gender, (2) the conduct must be severe or pervasive, (3)
the perspective of a reasonable woman must be utilized, and (4)
the employment conditions must be altered and the working environment hostile. Id. at 603-04, 626 A.2d at 453. The court commented that the second, third and fourth prongs are
interdependent. Id. at 604, 626 A.2d at 453. The court reasoned
this to be true because to determine the severity or pervasiveness of
the conduct, one must rely on what the reasonable woman would
deem to be severe or pervasive enough to create the hostile working environment. Id., 626 A.2d at 453-54. The court, however, asserted that the first prong is separate and distinct from the others.
Id., 626 A.2d at 454.
Addressing the first prong of the test, Justice Garibaldi pronounced that the LAD plaintiff must show by a preponderance of
the evidence that the discrimination suffered was due to her sex.
Id. Since the LAD is not a fault-based statute, the justice also declared that the employer's intent is immaterial in assessing the
LAD claim. Id. at 604-05, 626 A.2d at 454. To establish the necessary proof, the court enunciated that when the harassment is sexist
or of a sexual nature, the first prong will automatically be satisfied.
Id. at 605, 626 A.2d at 454. Conversely, when it is not conspicuously evident that the harassment is sex-based, the court concluded
that the plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that it is more
likely than not that the harassment occurred due to her sex. Id.,
626 A.2d at 454. Should the plaintiff be male, the court required
an "additional showing that the defendant employer is the rare employer who discriminates against the historically-privileged group."
Id. at 605-06, 626 A.2d at 454 (citation omitted).
Justice Garibaldi next addressed the second prong of the test,
concerning the severity or pervasiveness of the harassing conduct.
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Id. at 606, 626 A.2d at 455. Rejecting the appellate division's use of
Andrews's "regular and pervasive" standard, the court adopted the
"4severe or pervasive" standard employed in federal Title VII cases.
Id. (citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
In addition to being incompatible with the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Meritor, the court also reasoned that the "regular
and pervasive" standard would bar a LAD action based on a single,
severe incident of harassment or multiple incidents that happened
to occur randomly. Id. Justice Garibaldi elucidated the importance of the disjunctive "severe or pervasive" standard by noting
that most hostile work environment sexual harassment claims contain multiple incidents of harassment. Id. at 607, 626 A.2d at 455.
When viewed independently, the court continued, these incidents
would not be considered severe, but collectively are sufficiently
pervasive to establish a hostile work environment. Id. Therefore,
the justice instructed future courts to forego a transactional analysis of each incident and instead consider their cumulative effect on
the working environment. Id.
Skipping to the fourth prong, the court examined the requisite level of harm needed to state a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim under the LAD. Id. Justice Garibaldi
surveyed the split among the federal courts on this issue, peripherally noting that the United States Supreme Court was about to rule
on this very question. Id. at 607-08, 626 A.2d at 455 (citing Harrisv.
Forklift Sys., 113 S.Ct. 1382 (1993)). The justice refuted the opinions of those federal courts which required a showing that the hostile work environment caused serious psychological damage to the
plaintiff. Id. at 608, 626 A.2d at 456 (citations omitted). The court
criticized this approach for its narrow view of the harm caused by
sexual harassment. Id. The court enumerated the various other
individual and societal harms which could arise as the result of sexual harassment, such as economic and time loss, physical stress,
and even homelessness. Id. at 609, 626 A.2d at 456. Consequently,
limiting the scope of the LAD to plaintiffs who suffered psychological harm, the court admonished, would be contrary to the remedial purpose of the LAD. Id.
Instead, the court followed those federal courts which held
that the harassing conduct must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter working conditions and create an abusive environment. Id.
at 608, 626 A.2d at 456 (citations omitted). Having reviewed the
various harms associated with sexual harassment, the court stressed
emphatically that under the LAD, discrimination is the primary
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harm to eradicate. Id. at 610, 626 A.2d at 457. The justice clarified
that additional harms to the plaintiff need not be shown. Id.
Therefore, the court declared that the harm needed to state a
cause of action is that the harassment must alter the working conditions so that a reasonable woman would consider the working environment to be hostile. Id. Furthermore, recognizing the
importance of a female plaintiffs perception of her work environment, the court concluded that evidence of other women's sexual
harassment is relevant to the determination of a hostile work environment. Id. at 610-11, 626 A.2d at 457.
Finally, evaluating the reasonable woman standard contained
in the third prong of the test, Justice Garibaldi elucidated the reasons given by the court for choosing an objective and gender-specific standard. Id. at 611-12, 626 A.2d at 457-58. Defending its
choice of an objective standard first, the court reiterated that the
LAD's primary purpose is to eliminate discrimination rather than
act as a tort scheme. Id. at 612, 626 A.2d at 458. Accordingly, the
court opined that an objective standard forces the trial court to
focus on the harassing conduct instead of the individual plaintiffs
reaction. Id.
Next, the court expounded that an objective standard provides the needed flexibility to deal with the evolving community
standards concerning sexual harassment. Id. Justice Garibaldi,
however, cautioned that the courts should not interpret this reasonableness standard as approving existing standards of discrimination as per se reasonable. Id.
Lastly, the court discerned that the LAD's purpose of eradicating real discrimination and harassment would not be served by a
subjective viewpoint. Id. The court criticized subjectivity due to
the existence of the hypersensitive employee or the unusually
tough and resilient employee. Id. at 613, 626 A.2d at 458. The
court speculated that the hypersensitive employee may have an idiosyncratic response to conduct that is not objectively viewed by a
reasonable woman as harassment. Id. Similarly, the court insinuated that the tough employee may be able to tolerate harassing
conduct that would create a hostile working environment for the
reasonable woman. Id. The court justified its reasoning by acknowledging that the reasonable woman standard includes both
sensitive and tough women. Id. Thus, the court directed that an
emotional response, by a woman who leans toward the sensitive
side, should not automatically be viewed as unreasonable. Id. at
613-14, 626 A.2d at 458-59. Indeed, the court perceived an emo-
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tional response to be "normal and common." Id. at 614, 626 A.2d
at 458.
Defending its choice of a gender-specific standard, the court
alleged that the reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased. Id., 626 A.2d at 459. For this reason, the court maintained
that a reasonable person standard would gloss over the different
perspectives between the male and female point of view concerning sexual harassment. Id. For example, the court buttressed its
reasoning by citing research that men find sexual comments directed at them to be harmless and even flattering, while women
find it offensive and intimidating. Id. (citation omitted). However,
in alluding to current societal attitudes towards homosexuals, the
court suggested that men would find sexual harassment directed at
them by other men to be extremely insulting and intimidating. Id.
Justice Garibaldi further speculated that the conflicting male and
female perspectives are the result of women having to live with the
daily threat of sexual violence and their apparent minority status in
the workforce. Id. at 615, 626 A.2d at 459. The court declared that
the finder of fact must be aware of and respect these differing perspectives in order to properly evaluate a sexual harassment claim.
Id.
Having proclaimed the standard for stating a cause of action
for hostile work environment sexual harassment, the court next revamped the employer liability standards so as to comport with the
1990 amendments to the LAD, which made all common law tort
action remedies available to the LAD plaintiff. Id. at 616, 626 A.2d
at 460. Looking first at equitable relief, Justice Garibaldi reaffirmed the policy already in existence that the employer would be
strictly liable for all equitable damages and relief. Id. at 617, 626
A.2d at 460. The court agreed with prior case law that the employer is the only party uniquely positioned to provide equitable
relief through hiring, promoting, reinstating, providing back pay,
firing the harasser or any other number of remedial actions. Id. It
is through these actions, the court observed, that the remedial purpose of the LAD, which is eliminating discrimination, could most
effectively be carried out. Id.
Unlike equitable damages, the justice opined, the employer is
usually not the only party capable or responsible for paying compensatory or punitive damages. Id. The court discerned that general principles of agency law could be applied in these instances
due to the Legislature's amendments to the LAD allowing all common law tort remedies. Id. Further buttressing this position, the
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court construed the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Meritoras rejecting strict liability for supervisory sexual harassment and
suggesting that courts look to agency principles for guidance. Id.
at 618-19, 626 A.2d at 461 (citation omitted). The court therefore
adopted the use of agency principles, specifically section 219 of the
Restatement (Second) of Agency, to determine the employer's liability for supervisory hostile work environment sexual harassment.
Id. at 619, 626 A.2d at 461.
The court elaborated that under section 219(1), when a supervisor acts in the scope of his employment and creates a hostile work
environment, the employer will be vicariously liable. Id., 626 A.2d
at 462. The court further explained that even if the supervisor was
acting outside the scope of his employment, the employer would
probably still be liable under the exceptions of section 219(2). Id.
at 619-20, 626 A.2d at 462. The court then listed these exceptions
as: 1) the employer "intended the conduct or consequences," 2)
the employer was reckless or negligent, 3) "the conduct violated a
non-delegable duty" of the employer, or 4) the supervisor "purported to act or to speak on behalf' of the employer or was "aided
in accomplishing the tort due to the agency relation." Id. at 619,
626 A.2d at 462.
The court forewarned employers that they may be held vicariously liable for compensatory damages if their "negligence, intent,
or apparent authorization of the harassing conduct" contributes to
the harm of the hostile work environment. Id. at 624, 626 A.2d at
464. Justice Garibaldi identified specific instances of vicarious liability such as when the supervisor abused delegated authority to
control the work environment, when the employer has actual or
constructive notice of the harassing conduct or if the employer
negligently or recklessly failed to establish an explicit sexual harassment policy with effective investigative and redress procedures. Id.
As for punitive damages, the court agreed with the appellate division below, holding that liability would attach only if the employer
acted with willful indifference or upper management actually participated in the harassing conduct. Id. at 624-25, 626 A.2d at 464.
(citations omitted).
Once again the New Jersey Supreme Court has demonstrated
why it is considered by many to be the most progressive court in
the nation. Declining to adopt guidelines set forth by other tribunals, the court struck out on its own to develop a test for sexual
harassment claims. It is no wonder that the United States Supreme
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Court's similar decision on November 9, 1993, in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., was anti-climatic.
The fact that Justice Garibaldi, the only woman on the court,
has written the opinion will not be lost on many attorneys.
Although Chief Justice Wilentz has stated in the past that factors
such as religion and gender do not play a part in his decision to
assign a case to a justice, one cannot help but speculate as to the
reasons behind this particular assignment.
Be that as it may, the court has tread upon new ground by
utilizing the "reasonable woman" standard instead of the "reasonable person" standard. At first blush, this may appear as a step
backward, especially to those phobic denizens of the politically correct 1990's. However, this could not be further from the truth.
Whereas the prior change from the long time use of the "reasonable man" standard to the reasonable person standard acknowledged the presence of women in a male dominated society, so to
does this decision. Rather than employ that familiar legalistic deity, the reasonable person, the court correctly recognized a reality
of life, that although substantively equal, men and women differ in
many respects, particularly in how they perceive events in the workplace. As the court astutely noted, sexual comments directed at
males may be perceived as flattering. In contrast, females may find
the same comments extremely offensive. It would seem absurd to
ignore the difference between the sexes in an issue so intimately
related to sex.
The court's decision will go far in preventing future instances
of hostile work environment sexual harassment. It explicitly broadens the employer's responsibility to prevent sexual harassment in
their place of business. The decision will most likely lead to an
increase in the number of complaints filed and make it easier for
the harassed employee to prevail in court. As a result, employers
will surely be compelled, lest they face the monetary consequences,
to enact more stringent measures to monitor and prevent sexual
harassment in the workplace.
Steven Yarusinsky
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TORTS-NEw JERSEY TORT CLAIMS ACT-POLICE OFFICER AND MuNICIPALITY IMMUNE FROM LIABILITY FOR INJURIES SUSTAINED
DURING POLICE PURSUIT ABSENT WILLFUL MISCONDUCT
THROUGH STATUTORILY IMPOSED IMMUNTY-

Tice v. Cramer, 133

N.J. 347, 627 A.2d 1090 (1993).
Defendant police officer Cramer was dispatched to a tavern in
Wildwood to investigate a melee. 133 N.J. at 351, 627 A.2d, at
1093. While approaching the tavern, Officer Cramer saw a car that
did not have its lights on exit a parking lot across from the tavern.
Id., 627 A.2d at 1093. Claiming that the car nearly collided with his
vehicle, Officer Cramer began to follow the car, which was driven
by William G. Logan. At this time, the police officer alleged that a
hammer was thrown out of the Logan vehicle in the direction of
the police car. The officer then began pursuing the vehicle, and
after going through a number of stop signs, the Logan vehicle
crashed into a vehicle operated by John W. Tice, Jr., who died as a
result of the accident. Id. at 351-52, 627 A.2d at 1093.
Plaintiff, John W. Tice, Sr., acting on behalf of his son, initiated suit against Officer Cramer and the City of Wildwood, alleging
that the police officer was negligent in his pursuit of the Logan
vehicle, and that the City was negligent for its failure to establish
adequate rules and training concerning police pursuit of vehicles.
Id. at 352, 627 A.2d at 1093.
The trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of Officer
Cramer and the City of Wildwood, determining that the police officer was immune from liability under Roll v. Timberman. Id. at 353,
627 A.2d at 1093 (citing Roll v. Timberman, 94 N.J. Super. 530 (App.
Div.), cert. denied, 50 N.J. 84 (1967)). The trial court further ruled
that two statutory provisions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2) and N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(3), provided the same basis of immunity established at common law and enunciated in Roll. Id. Affirming the
decision of the trial court, the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, relied on Roll and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2), and
further held that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-3, provided an additional
basis for immunity if the police officer is found to have acted in
good faith. Id. Chief Justice Wilentz, writing the majority opinion
for a unanimous court, held that under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:52b(2), the police officer and municipality were immune from liability absent willful misconduct on the part of the police officer. Id.
at 356, 627 A.2d at 1095.
The New Jersey Supreme Court began its analysis by briefly
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reviewing the New Jersey Tort Claims Act's (Act) application to
public entities and their employees. Id. at 355, 627 A.2d at 1094.
The court stated generally that where so provided in the Act, immunity is the rule and liability is the exception. Id., 627 A.2d at
1095. Turning to the case at bar, the court contemplated the common law immunity as articulated in RolL Id. at 356-57, 627 A.2d at
1095. Conceding that Roll was somewhat ambiguous, the court explained that Roll reflected the general theme that a police officer is
immunized from potential liability as a matter of law. Id. at 358,
627 A.2d at 1096. Therefore, the court continued, police officer
liability is withheld from jury fact-finding regardless of the officer's
negligence. Id. Nevertheless, the court remarked, Roll is ultimately
irrelevant because the Act incorporates Roll's common law rule
with consistent statutory provisions and remains the controlling law
on police officer immunity today. Id. at 359, 627 A.2d at 1096.
Next, the court considered N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2), which
states in pertinent part, "[n] either a public entity nor a public employee is liable for . . . any injury caused by . . . an escaping or
escaped person . . . ." Id. at 359, 627 A.2d at 1097 (quoting N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2)). The court rebutted plaintiff's argument
that this statutory provision was inapplicable because Logan was
not "escaping" or "escaped". Id. at 360-61, 627 A.2d at 1097. Instead, the court proffered that the Legislature did not intend for
the immunity to depend on such technical distinctions based on
the status of persons being pursued. Id. Moreover, the court
maintained that this section of the Act certainly applied to situations where police officers were in pursuit of escaping or escaped
wrongdoers. Id. at 362, 627 A.2d at 1098. Therefore, the court
determined, the Act clearly applies to the case at hand. Id.
The court explained that it was befuddled by the interpretation of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2) in previous court decisions. Id.
at 363, 627 A.2d at 1099. For a direct example, the court cited
Floodmand v. State, which held that statutory immunity did not apply when both the public entity and public employee were negligent. Id. at 363-64, 627 A.2d at 1099 (citing Floodmand v. State, 175
N.J. Super. 503, 420 A.2d 360 (App. Div. 1980)). Nevertheless, the
New Jersey Supreme Court found that the statutory provision expressly provided for immunity, despite the possible existence of
concurrent negligence. Id. at 364, 627 A.2d at 1099. The supreme
court remarked that the Burg v. State analysis more closely corresponded with the correct interpretation of NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:52b(2), which provides for absolute immunity for the public entity
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and employee, regardless of whether the negligence is "discretionary or ministerial, whether acts of omission or commission." Id.
(citing Burg v. State, 147 NJ. Super. 316, cert. denied, 75 NJ. 11
(1977)). The court noted that such an interpretation advanced
the policy goal of vigorous law enforcement. Id. at 365, 627 A.2d at
1100.
After insulating a police officer's immunity under NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 59:5-2b(2), the court turned to the amicus curiae Policeman Benevolent Association's argument that the policeman was
immunized from liability through discretionary immunity, as provided in NJ. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-2a. Id. at 366, 627 A.2d at 1100.
The court summarily disposed of this argument by recognizing that
discretionary immunity is limited to decisions made in high level
government policy or planning matters. Id. (citing Costa v.Josey, 83
N.J. 49, 54-55 (1980)). Moreover, the court warned that a holding
based on discretionary immunity for the alleged negligence of a
police officer or public entity could be potentially far-reaching. Id.
at 366-67, 627 A.2d at 1100-01.
The court then commented on two motor vehicle statutory
provisions that support an officer's right to exceed speed limits
when in hot pursuit. Id. at 368, 627 A.2d at 1101 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39:4-103, 4-91). Furthermore, the court explained that the
statutes impose a duty on police officers to exercise due care, and
provide for concurrent liability for injuries caused through the officers' "reckless disregard for the safety of others." Id. at 368, 627
A.2d at 1101 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:4-103, 4-91). The
court held that these motor vehicle provisions were inconsistent
with absolute immunity, absent wilful misconduct, as conferred by
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(2). Id. at 369, 627 A.2d at 1102. The
court clarified that the New Jersey Legislature, for the purpose of
furthering legislative policy promoting vigorous law enforcement,
intended the Act's principles of immunity to be controlling. Id. at
371, 627 A.2d at 1103.
Chief Justice Wilentz next focused on good faith immunity, as
codified in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:3-3. Id. at 374, 627 A.2d at 1104.
Although the supreme court expressed concern about the appropriateness of the appellate division's summary judgment based on
"good faith" immunity, the court deferred the issue by asserting
that immunity was better conferred through N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:52b(2). Id. Nevertheless, the court emphasized that even though
the provision under the Act may extend immunity, a public entity
and police officer may still be found liable under a federal civil
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rights violation as set forth in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Id. at 375, 627
A.2d at 1105.
The majority opinion next appraised Justice Clifford's concurrence calling for reliance on N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(3) to provide immunity. Id. Earlier in its decision, the court recited the
relevant statutory provision which reads, "[n] either a public entity
nor a public employee is liable for ... any injury caused by ... a
person resisting arrest .... " Id. at 359, 627 A.2d at 1097 (quoting
N.J. STAT. ANN § 59:5-2). The majority conveyed that the "resisting
arrest" provision would confer immunity in some situations, and
might even provide immunity in this case pending a plenary factual
hearing. Id. at 375, 627 A.2d at 1105. The court warned, however,
that relying solely on the "resisting arrest" language could provide
a gap in immunity coverage when it was difficult to determine
whether the person fleeing from police was actually resisting arrest.
Id. at 377, 627 A.2d at 1106. Resting on such technical distinctions
as to whether a person was resisting arrest, the court proffered,
would not encourage aggressive law enforcement. Id. at 378, 627
A.2d at 1107.
Finally, the majority articulated the competing policy considerations inherent in this case: whether encouraging aggressive law
enforcement should take precedence over encouraging police officers to minimize unnecessary injuries. Id. at 381, 627 A.2d at
1108. The majority insisted that allowing immunity did not prevent the municipality from taking steps to protect the public from
unnecessary injuries stemming from police conduct. Id. Therefore, the court declared that such far reaching immunity was intended by the Legislature, and should be honored by the court. Id.
at 380, 627 A.2d at 1108.
Justice O'Hern filed a separate concurring opinion, in which
he proposed that immunity should have been based on N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:3-3, which excludes an employee and employer from liability when the employee acts in good faith. Id. 382, 627 A.2d at
1108 (O'Hern, J., concurring). Justice O'Hern contended that
good faith immunity is more consistent with the language and internal structure of the Act, and would likely converge with the wilful misconduct exception when applied. Id. In addition, the
justice proffered that such immunity better insulates the police officer from liability, allowing the police officer who is involved in
vehicular pursuits to make split-second decisions without fear of
potential liability. Id. at 384, 627 A.2d at 1110 (O'Hern, J., concurring) (quoting Travis v. City of Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 103 (Tex.
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1992) (Cornyn, J., concurring)). This benefit, Justice O'Hem asserted, further promotes a policy of vigorous law enforcement. Id.
Justice Clifford filed a separate concurring opinion in which
Justice Handler and Justice Pollockjoined. Id. at 385, 627 A.2d at
1110 (Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford posited that the
person being pursued in this case, Logan, was incorrectly characterized as an "escaping" person, and would be better characterized
as a person "resisting arrest", therefore falling under the statutory
immunity of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b(3). Id. AlthoughJustice Clifford discerned from the court's opinion that the police officer
would clearly have placed Logan under arrest, the justice recognized that it may be necessary for the officer to state such intentions for summary judgment purposes. Id. at 386, 627 A.2d at 1111
(Clifford, J., concurring). Justice Clifford then mentioned that if a
person could not be classified as one resisting arrest, then existing
case law would still provide for immunity. Id. (citing Rol, 50 N.J.
84 (1967)). Lastly, the justice declared that the Legislature intended for a narrower immunity under N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-2b
than the majority interpreted from its reliance on Burg. Id. at 388,
627 A.2d at 1112. (Clifford, J., concurring). That is, Justice Clifford clarified, police officer and public entity immunity is conferred, regardless of the police officer's negligence, only when the
injury is caused by the escaping or escaped person and not from
the escape itself. Id.
The court's opinions reflect the New Jersey Legislature's intention to provide immunity for a police officer and public entity
in situations involving a potential for negligence when police officers are engaged in hot pursuit. Likewise, the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act protects those officers and public entities from unwarranted liability when carrying out their duties in an effort to aggressively enforce the law. The majority opinion appears to reflect the
broadest and most justified terms of immunity for the police officer, through classification of a person as an escaping or escaped
person. Justice Clifford's opinion, however, seems to rely on overly
technical grounds, only conferring liability when a person is resisting arrest. Moreover, Justice O'Hern's reliance on good faith
seems inappropriate and unnecessary in this case where another
statutory provision so clearly absolves the public entity and police
officer of liability.
Indeed, there are important policy considerations in this case
and the court has correctly deferred these policy distinctions to the
decisions of the New Jersey Legislature. The Legislature has made
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the decision to provide for absolute immunity despite competing
concerns of public safety and welfare. It is the function of this
court to honor the intention of the Legislature, absent constitutional infractions. Here, the court's deference to the legislative decision is certainly warranted.
Susan J Schleck

TORTS-PUBLIC ENTn-v LIABILITY-PUBLIc ENTITY LIABILITY FOR A
DANGEROUS CONDITION REQUIRES THAT A PHYSICAL DEFECT OF

THE PROPERTY BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S IN-

jURY-Levin v. County of Salem, 133 N.J. 35, 626 A.2d 1091
(1993).
In 1987, Richard Levin dove off the Garden Road Bridge spanning the Maurice River in southern NewJersey and struck his head
on the shallow bottom. 133 NJ. at 38, 626 A.2d at 1092. Levin
sustained spinal cord injuries which rendered him a quadriplegic,
and sued the counties of Salem and Cumberland, which jointly
owned, maintained, and controlled the bridge, and the towns of
Pittsgrove, in Salem County, and Vineland, in Cumberland County,
both of which were adjacent to the bridge. Id. at 38-40, 626 A.2d at
1092-1093.
The defendants were aware that the Garden Road Bridge had
been the site of recreational activities, including swimming and diving, prior to the plaintiffs accident. Id. at 38-39, 626 A.2d at 1092.
Both counties maintained that after a similar accident in 1978,
warning signs prohibiting swimming and diving were posted on the
bridge. Id. at 3940, 626 A.2d at 1093. Additionally, in 1986, the
Salem County Board of Chosen Freeholders enacted a resolution
barring diving and other recreational activities from county
bridges. Id. at 40, 626 A.2d at 1093.
Levin, however, contended that the resolution had not been
enforced, that he frequently participated in activities at the bridge
prior to his accident, and finally that he was unaware of any restrictions on activities at the bridge. Id., 626 A.2d at 1092. The plaintiff
further contended that the public entities' failure to provide warnings, safety measures, or supervision at the bridge caused the
bridge to exist in a dangerous condition, which in turn caused his

19931

SURVEY

1185

injuries. Id. at 41, 626 A.2d at 1094. Levin relied upon the proviso
of the NewJersey Tort Claims Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 59:1-1 to 12:3
(the Act or the New Jersey Act), which provides that a public entity
will not be immune from liability when a dangerous condition exists. Id. at 42, 626 A.2d at 1094 (relying upon N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 59:2-7).
All of the defendant public entities were granted summary
judgment by the trial court. Id. In granting Salem and Cumberland Counties' motions, the trial court concluded that as a matter
of law, the public bridge did not exist in a dangerous condition.
Id. at 40-41, 626 A.2d at 1093-94. The appellate division affirmed
the trial court's decision, and the NewJersey Supreme Court subsequently granted the plaintiffs request for certification. Id. at 41,
626 A.2d at 1094 (citations omitted).
Affirming the appellate division, Justice O'Hern, writing for
the court, held that to establish liability of a public entity under the
New Jersey Act, a plaintiff must establish that a physical defect of
the property caused the plaintiffs injury. Id. at 49-50, 626 A.2d at
1098. The justice concluded that Levin's injury was not caused by
any physical defect of the Garden Road Bridge. Id.
The New Jersey Act, Justice O'Hern exlpained, imposes liability on a public entity where a dangerous condition existing on public property is shown to be the proximate cause of a reasonably
foreseeable injury. Id. at 42, 626 A.2d at 1094 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:4-2). The court continued that a plaintiff is further required to establish that the dangerous condition was created by the
public entity's agents, or that it had actual or constructive notice
that a problem requiring attention existed. Id. The court elucidated that the Act exempts public entities from liability for corrective measures taken to remedy existing conditions provided such
measures were not "palpably unreasonable." Id. Finally, the justice
noted that the Act defines dangerous condition as "a condition of
property that creates a substantial risk of injury when such property
is used with due care in a manner in which it is reasonably foreseeable that it will be used." Id. (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-1a.).
The majority rejected Salem County's argument that it was immune from liability under the 1986 resolution banning diving from
county bridges. Id. Justice O'Hern elaborated that acceptance of
the county's position would permit a public entity to immunize itself from liability in many cases simply by outlawing a wide variety
of behavior. Id. at 42-43, 626 A.2d at 1094.
Accordingly, the court sought to resolve whether the illegal
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use of public property for recreational activities renders the property in a dangerous condition under the Act when the activities
themselves are potentially dangerous. Id. at 37, 626 A.2d at 1092
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-2). The majority delineated as its
task the determination of the cause of the accident, and whether
that the cause or condition of the property was intended to be immunized by the Legislature. Id. at 43, 626 A.2d at 1094-95. (quoting Weiss v. New Jersey Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 380, 608 A.2d 254

(1992)).
Justice O'Hern proceeded to identify three possible causes of
the accident for which the defendants could conceivably be held
responsible. Id., 626 A.2d at 1095. The majority set forth that a
first possible cause was if the bridge was designed in a way that
permitted people to dive from it. Id. The second reason, the court
set forth, was if the defendants either failed to enact laws prohibiting diving from the bridge or failed to enforce relevant existing
laws, and the third reason was if the defendants were aware that
leisure activities were occurring at the bridge and failed to supervise those activities. Id. The court concluded that under all three
theories, however, the defendants were exempted from liability by
the Act. Id.
Specifically, the failure to construct a barrier to potential divers, Justice O'Hern explained, was exempt under the plan-or-design provision of the Act. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6). The
justice continued that public entities are not subject to liability for
failing to enact or enforce laws under the Act. Id. (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 59:2-4). Similarly, the majority pointed out, the Act also
exempts from liability the failure to supervise a public recreational
facility. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:2-7).
Justice O'Hern next addressed Levin's contention that the
bridge existed in a dangerous condition, and that the Act did not
provide immunity for injuries resulting from dangerous conditions
of property. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. 59:4-2). The plaintiff argued that a jury should decide whether his use of the property was
with due care in a reasonably forseeable manner, and whether
such use created the existence of a dangerous condition. Id.
The court noted that Levin relied upon an appellate division
opinion which maintained that "whether a dangerous condition is
present depends on a combination of factors relating to physical
condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior." Id. at 43-44, 626 A.2d at 1095 (quoting Burroughs v. City of
Atlantic City, 234 N.J. Super. 208, 560 A.2d 725 (App. Div.), cert.
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denied, 117 NJ. 647, 569 A.2d 1345 (1989)). Justice O'Hern acknowledged that in Burroughs, which also involved unauthorized
diving, the court concluded that the public entity was not liable
where it had taken affirmative steps to prevent the conduct that
resulted in the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 44, 626 A.2d at 1095.
Questioning the broad rationale of the Burroughs court-that
a dangerous condition may arise from a combination of factorsthe majority asserted that courts had previously interpreted "dangerous condition" as referring to an actual physical condition of
the property, and not to activities taking place on the property. Id.
(citations omitted). Justice O'Hern worried that allowing activities
to be considered as a part of the dangerous condition standard
would erode the effectiveness of the plan-or-design immunity provision of the Act. Id. at 45, 626 A.2d at 1096. The justice pointed
out that the bridge in question was intended for use by pedestrians
as well as vehicles, and concluded that the designer's decision not
to construct a barrier against divers was immune from liability
under New Jersey law. Id. at 45-46, 626 A.2d at 1096 (citing NJ.
STAT. ANN. § 59:4-6)
The majority next surveyed interpretations of the California
Tort Claims Act, which served as the model for the New Jersey Act.
Id. at 46-49, 626 A.2d at 1096-98. Justice O'Hern determined that
California courts generally question whether an injury arose from a
defect in the property or from some other cause. Id. at 46, 626
A.2d at 1096. The justice determined that California courts have
usually required, as an essential element to public entity liability, a
defect in the property that was not readily obvious to persons using
the property with due care. Id. at 46-48, 626 A.2d at 1096-97 (citations omitted).
Finally, the court rejected as inconsistent with precedent the
proposition that the effect of a condition of property was relevant
to a determination of whether a dangerous condition existed. Id.
at 49, 626 A.2d at 1098. Justice O'Hern opined that accepting effects as a consideration would necessarily result in courts finding a
dangerous condition in every situation where there existed a potential for harm. Id. The court remarked that the conduct of a
third party remained relevant where neglect or misconduct combined with an existing condition to create an unsafe condition. Id.
The majority concluded that Levin's injury was not caused by a
physical defect of the bridge. Id. Diving from the bridge was dangerous, the court elucidated, because "the bridge was where the
shallow water was", and not because of something the defendants
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did or did not do. Id. at 49-50, 626 A.2d at 1098. Accordingly, the
supreme court held that to hold a public entity liable for a plaintiff's injury, an actual physical defect of the property must have
caused the injury. Id.
Justice Stein, joined by Justice Handler, authored a forceful
dissent. Id. at 50-63, 626 A.2d at 1098-1105 (Stein, J., dissenting).
After reexamining the facts, the dissent first dissected the Act's definition of "dangerous condition" into two prongs. Id. at 52, 626
A.2d at 1099-1100 (Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein set forth that
the first prong requires the property to be used with due care, and
the second requires the usage to be reasonably foreseeable. Id.,
626 A.2d at 1100 (Stein,J., dissenting). Thejustice posited that the
threshold question was whether Levin's complaint set forth a genuine issue of material fact regarding the bridge's existence in a dangerous condition. Id.
Looking to California law for guidance, the dissent challenged
the majority's construction of the foreseeable use element of the
California Tort Claims Act. Id. at 53, 58, 626 A.2d at 1100, 1103
(Stein, J., dissenting). Justice Stein observed that the comment to
the California Act's definition of "dangerous condition" included
illegal and unintended uses within the scope of foreseeable uses.
Id. (citation omitted). The justice then cited California cases
which concluded that dangerous conditions could arise where
property was put to unintended uses. Id. at 53-54, 626 A.2d at
1100-01 (Stein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
The dissent disputed the majority's conclusion that California
law focused on the existence of a defect, maintaining that the central question for California is whether public property, or a condition of the property, "pose [s] a substantial risk of injury to a
foreseeable user" when a foreseeable activity is performed on the
property. Id. at 54, 626 A.2d at 1101 (Stein, J., dissenting).
Accordingly, Justice Stein criticized the majority's rejection of
the Burrough court's formulation that the existence of a dangerous
condition "depends on a combination of factors relating to physical condition, permitted conduct, and objectively foreseeable behavior." Id. at 56-57, 626 A.2d at 1101-02 (Stein, J., dissenting)
(quoting Burroughs v. City of Atlantic City, 234 N.J. Super. 208, 21819, 560 A.2d 725 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 117 N.J. 647, 569 A.2d
1345 (1989)). Justice Stein reiterated that the majority had relied
on other appellate opinions to hold that a dangerous condition
refers to the condition of the property itself. Id. The justice discredited this reliance, asserting that the cases relied upon by the
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majority were distinguishable because they held that a public entity
is not culpable when a plaintiff is injured on public property by a
third party's criminal actions. Id. at 57-58, 626 A.2d at 1102-03
(Stein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). The dissent maintained
that the premise of Burroughs was, in fact, consistent with the New
Jersey Legislature's intent as well as California case law. Id. at 58,
626 A.2d at 1103 (Stein, J., dissenting). Thus, concluding that the
majority misconstrued the Act's definition of a dangerous condition, the dissent declared that a reasonably foreseeable use includes unintended uses of public property. Id. at 59, 626 A.2d at
1103.
The dissent next examined the Act's provision that a dangerous condition exists where a condition creates a risk of injury when
the property is used with due care. Id. at 59-61, 626 A.2d at 1103-04
(Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent posited that this condition requires activities to be objectively reasonable, and that the reasonableness of an activity is measurable against the standards of a
community, thus protecting the interests of public entities by factoring out the isolated acts of daredevils. Id. at 60-61, 626 A.2d at
1104 (Stein, J., dissenting). The dissent insisted that where a public entity tacitly permits the public to engage in conduct, a dangerous condition within the scope of the Act may develop. Id. at 61,
626 A.2d at 1104 (Stein, J., dissenting).
The dissent concluded that because Levin raised material issues of fact, the case should be remanded for a jury trial. Id. at 6162, 626 A.2d at 1104-05 (Stein,J., dissenting). For example, Justice
Stein maintained that ajury could find that the public entities were
palpably unreasonable in their failure to warn against diving, or in
their failure to remedy a dangerous condition. Id. at 61, 626 A.2d
at 1104 (Stein, J., dissenting). Conceding that the Act was intended to establish "immunity [as] the rule, and liability the exception", the dissent stressed that public entities must be held liable
for injuries sustained as a result of a dangerous condition if it is
found that actions taken or not taken with respect to the condition
were palpably unreasonable. Id. at 61-62, 626 A.2d at 1104-05
(Stein, J., dissenting).
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that a bridge did
not exist in a dangerous condition where the plaintiff engaged in
an unauthorized and risky activity on that bridge and was severely
injured as a result. In so holding, the majority apparently sought
to advance the broad purpose of the Tort Claims Act, to protect
public entities from broad liability.
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However, the Act's exemption from liability is not absolute
and public entities may and must be held liable for injuries resulting from a dangerous condition of public property. As the dissent
observed, the Act reflects the view that public entities will act to
protect the public from unsafe conditions of public property. Accordingly, the Act provides for liability where a public entity's response to a dangerous condition is "palpably unreasonable."
In light of these considerations, the majority's conclusion that
liability is predicated upon the existence of a physical defect of the
property is an unfortunate limitation of the Act's protection of the
public. More troubling is the majority's equation of "foreseeable
use" with only those uses for which the subject property was intended. The dissent's construction of "foreseeable use," which
would take into account the conduct of individuals using public
property, including unintended uses of the property, is ultimately
more satisfying and realistic than the exceedingly narrow submission of the majority. Equating foreseeable uses of property with
reasonable conduct which is, in fact, engaged in by members of a
community is consistent with the Legislature's intention that unreasonable failures of government entities to protect the public
from dangerous conditions should not be protected from liability.
The result reached by the majority in Levin, despite the apparent
intention of advancing the goals of the Act, ultimately undermines
the Act as a whole by improperly limiting an injured party's ability
to recover for the failure of public entities to properly respond to a
dangerous condition of property.
James Carey

